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Summary 
 
This paper has one main objective, to examine the extent to which evidence of a bequest 
motive can be found in data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The approach used is 
to look at whether individuals with children save more, as would be predicted if the bequest 
motive were important. 
By and larger there are three main motivations for saving described in the research literature. 
There is precautionary saving, which is the motivation for saving that arises out of a need to 
insure oneself against adverse events. There is life-cycle saving, which is the motivation for 
saving in order to smooth the consumption across ones life-time, typically saving more during 
ones prime working years to both pay off debts incurred previously and save for the 
retirement years to come. Finally there is dynastic saving; saving that is motivated by a desire 
to give bequests to ones offspring. In addition to these three elements in the puzzle, various 
authors emphasize other factors, such as the accumulation of wealth for its own sake, the 
accumulation of wealth as part of a decision to be an entrepreneur, or heterogeneous 
preferences of some sort giving different propensities to save for different individuals. There 
are many theoretical papers that provide rich models to explain the behavior of individuals. 
Becker and Tomes (1994) is one prominent such example. 
There are also numerous papers that combine some or all of these motivations to create 
models, and use these models to predict the earning processes and saving decisions at the 
individual level. Those models can then be given realistic parameters to attempt to simulate 
the distribution of income. These simulations can then be used to check what elements from 
saving theory are needed to get the “correct” result. An example of this approach can be found 
in De Nardi (2002). 
This is not the goal of this paper. This paper does not attempt to provide a realistic model of 
saving behavior and its relationship to the rest of the economy to explain the patterns seen in 
the data. Its goals are more modest. By using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
the longest running longitudinal household survey in the world, this paper will examine the 
extent to which predictions made by various saving motivations are supported by the data. 
Specifically the paper will look at whether the presence or absence of children has a 
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significant on saving behavior. This is done by using panel data from the PSID to check 
whether there is a positive relationship between an individual having adult children and his 
saving rate. Adult children is chosen as the key indicator, because individuals with adult 
children will, unlike those with underage children, not have generally higher expenses than 
the childless, but do have a potential bequest motive in their saving behavior.  
The main analysis is based on a panel regression. The panel consists of individual saving rates 
between the years 1999 and 2001, 2001 and 2003, 2003 and 2005, 2005 and 2007, and 2007 
and 2009. Because the individuals in the analysis belong to households and families, there is 
clustering in the data. This requires the use robust standard errors. A Hausman test revealed 
that a random effects model would yield biased estimators. This means that the rest of the 
empirical analysis was undertaken using a fixed effects model. To supplement the analysis of 
the panel data, a median regression of a longer saving rate is run, as well as a regression on 
the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentile and an OLS-regression with cluster robust standard errors. Here 
the saving rate is defined as the change in wealth over the eight-year period from 1999 to 
2007, divided by a measure of the income from this period (the average income described 
earlier multiplied by eight). 
Summary statistics of the data used showed clear indications of a life-cycle pattern in the 
saving rates. Furthermore the effect of the business cycle was visible, which can be 
interpreted as supporting a precautionary motive, if the higher saving in boom years and 
lower saving in recession years were the results of deliberate choices, rather than simply 
volatility in asset prices. 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, the fixed effect model panel regression provided 
support for the presence of a bequest motive. Both the adult children indicator and the 
presence of dependents in the household, the majority of which are the children of the 
economic decision makers in the household, had a statistically significant positive effect on 
the saving rate. Surprisingly the effect of adult children decreased with income, which is the 
opposite of what one would expect. The results from this analysis also confirmed the positive 
effect of income and wealth in general, and gave some indication of a life-cycle pattern in the 
saving rates. The analysis of long term saving rates using quantile regressions and a cluster 
robust OLS-regression gave strikingly different results. Where the effects of adult children 
and dependents was significant, it had the opposite sign of the one found in the panel analysis. 
Interestingly the interaction variable between income and adult children was positive in this 
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analysis. This means that for a sufficiently high income, the net effect of having adult children 
is to increase the saving rate. This is accordance with the theoretical prediction; however this 
was only seen for the median regression and for the regression of the lowest quintile of the 
saving rate distribution. The results are therefore largely inconclusive with respect to whether 
a bequest motive can be identified in the data. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper has one main objective, to examine the extent to which evidence of a bequest 
motive can be found in data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The approach used is 
to look at whether individuals with children save more, as would be predicted if the bequest 
motive were important. 
Inequality of income and inequality of wealth have increasingly become important questions 
in economics and public policy. An important factor behind this is the realization that the 
inequality is higher than have been previously thought, an insight produced by improved 
sources of data, such as Piketty and Saez (2003) use of IRS-data to document the large and 
increasing share of the total income going to the top 1 % and 0.1 % of the income distribution. 
It has long been recognized that the inequality of wealth is significantly higher than the 
inequality of income. This simultaneously makes inequality of wealth an interesting field of 
study, and poses a puzzle for researchers. Since wealth at the core is simply accumulated 
income, there is no obvious reason why the inequality of wealth should be higher. Indeed 
Friedman (1957) proposed that the higher saving rates seen among those with high incomes 
were an illusion, caused by not properly accounting for the permanent and transient 
components of income. To explain the inequality of wealth it is therefore necessary to look 
carefully at motivations for saving. This has value beyond simply explaining the distribution 
found in the data. Saving behavior play important roles in many macro-economic models, and 
improving the realism of these models necessitates better descriptions of saving behavior and 
capital accumulation at the micro level. Policy questions such as the expected effect of estate 
taxes on saving also require correct descriptions of the motivations for saving. 
By and larger there are three main motivations for saving described in the research literature. 
There is precautionary saving, which is the motivation for saving that arises out of a need to 
insure oneself against adverse events. There is life-cycle saving, which is the motivation for 
saving in order to smooth the consumption across ones life-time, typically saving more during 
ones prime working years to both pay off debts incurred previously and save for the 
retirement years to come. Finally there is dynastic saving; saving that is motivated by a desire 
to give bequests to ones offspring. In addition to these three elements in the puzzle, various 
authors emphasize other factors, such as the accumulation of wealth for its own sake, the 
accumulation of wealth as part of a decision to be an entrepreneur, or heterogeneous 
2 
 
preferences of some sort giving different propensities to save for different individuals. There 
are many theoretical papers that provide rich models to explain the behavior of individuals. 
Becker and Tomes (1994) is one prominent such example. 
There are also numerous papers that combine some or all of these motivations to create 
models, and use these models to predict the earning processes and saving decisions at the 
individual level. Those models can then be given realistic parameters to attempt to simulate 
the distribution of income. These simulations can then be used to check what elements from 
saving theory are needed to get the “correct” result. An example of this approach can be found 
in De Nardi (2002). 
This is not the goal of this paper. This paper does not attempt to provide a realistic model of 
saving behavior and its relationship to the rest of the economy to explain the patterns seen in 
the data. Its goals are more modest. By using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
the longest running longitudinal household survey in the world, this paper will examine the 
extent to which predictions made by various saving motivations are supported by the data. 
Specifically the paper will look at whether the presence or absence of children has a 
significant on saving behavior. This is done by using panel data from the PSID to check 
whether there is a positive relationship between an individual having adult children and his 
saving rate. Adult children is chosen as the key indicator, because individuals with adult 
children will, unlike those with underage children, not have generally higher expenses than 
the childless, but do have a potential bequest motive in their saving behavior. 
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2 Literature review  
This section looks at previous empirical findings, and what support different theories of 
saving find in previous research. 
2.1 Facts on the distribution of wealth 
The determinants of the saving rates and wealth accumulation of individuals, and thus the 
wealth distribution in society, have been examined numerous times. According to Díaz-
Giménez et al (1997) income and wealth are both unequally distributed, but the distributions 
of the two vary considerably. Wealth is much more unevenly distributed, with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.78 and a ratio of the wealth of the top 1 % to that of the bottom 40 % of 875. 
This is a very high level of inequality; the equivalent numbers for income are 0.57 and 84. 
They also report a low correlation between income and wealth. They use the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and the Survey of Consumer Finances to reach their conclusions. Other 
findings include that marital status and having children in the household are important factors 
determining income and wealth levels. For example, the ratio of the wealth level of singles 
without dependent children and singles with dependent children is 120. 
The divergence of income and wealth distributions could to some extent be a result of the data 
used. Using data based on tax returns from the IRS Piketty and Saez (2003) document a 
sharply increasing income share of the top parts of the income distribution. They report that 
the wage income share of the top 0.1 % of the income distribution was 4.13 % in 1998, with 
the top 1 % earning 10.88 % of the total wage income. 
2.1.1 Do the rich save more? 
One important empirical question is the extent to which the saving rate increases with 
permanent income, so that richer individuals save a larger proportion of their income. This 
was a question that was extensively studied in the year following the formulation of the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis in Friedman (1957). This hypothesis predicts that the saving 
rate does not increase with income. Dynnan et al (2000) have looked at this question. They 
base their study on data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, the Survey of Consumer 
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Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Based on these data sources, they conclude 
that there is a strong positive relationship between saving rates and personal income. 
2.1.2 Does wealth decline after retirement? 
Another important question is whether wealth declines after retirement. Bernheim (1987) 
finds using panel data that bequeathable wealth does declines after retirement. Bequeathable 
wealth is defined as wealth excluding annuities, and similar wealth such as Social Security 
benefits. The rate of decline is estimate at 1 to 2 % per year for single individuals, but close to 
zero for most couples. When annuities are included, no decline is found. The data used in this 
study is the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. 
2.1.3 Do individuals with children save more? 
Whether individuals with children save more is an important empirical question, as it 
indicates whether there is in fact evidence of a bequest motive. Despite the relevance of this 
question to theories of saving, it has not garnered a lot of attention in the literature. Hurd 
(1986), one of the few studies that look at this question, does not find a higher level of saving 
for those with children.  
2.2 Explaining the wealth distribution with theories 
of saving 
2.2.1 Permanent Income hypothesis 
One of the earliest and most influential theories of saving behavior is the Permanent Income 
hypothesis. Presented by Friedman (1957), it predicts that individuals will attempt to smooth 
their consumption as much as possible, so that it tracks the permanent income. The permanent 
income can defined as the annual income available if one were to spreading out the whole 
life-time income evenly. Permanent income can be contrasted with the actual income at any 
one point. The annual income will be related to the permanent income, but also contain a 
transient component. The transient component can be either negative or positive, 
corresponding to an unusually low income and an unusually high income. Friedman used this 
theory to show that empirical findings showing higher saving rates among those with higher 
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income did not necessarily imply that the rich saved more. It could be explained by 
temporarily high incomes leading to the higher saving rates, and temporarily low incomes 
leading to lower saving rates or even dissaving. The permanent income hypothesis has two 
clear implications for saving behavior. The first is that temporary high income will be saved 
and that individuals will save to avoid decreased consumption due to temporarily low income. 
The second is that individuals will attempt to smooth their consumption across their lifetime. 
These two implications give rise to models to precautionary saving models and life-cycle 
saving models respectively. While the assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis, such 
that almost all transient income will be saved, might be too strong, the key prediction of 
income smoothing is clearly important in determining saving behavior. 
2.2.2 Precautionary saving 
Precautionary saving is motivated by uncertainty about the future. The source of this 
uncertainty can be manifold. The most important things individuals can be uncertain about, 
that would motivate higher saving are, future income, the length of ones life and large 
expenses such as medical expenses. Uncertainty about future income leads to saving in order 
to maintain the ability to spend at a level close to that allowed by the permanent income, even 
in the presence of negative income shocks. Uncertainty about the time of ones death 
complicates the process of saving for retirement, as one does not know how much money one 
is going to need. Large unavoidable expenses such as medical expenses have an effect similar 
to that of negative income shocks, with the motivation for saving being to hold the rest of the 
consumption steady despite the extra expenses. Hubbard et al (1994) finds support for 
precautionary motive. They create a life-cycle model that includes those uncertainties listed 
and show that such a model can match the key facts of the wealth distribution. An important 
fact needed to achieve the correct result is that consumers must be unable to insure against 
negative income shocks, and cannot be able to effectively annuitize their wealth in order to 
with certainty achieve the desired level of saving in old-age. Carroll (1997) uses a “buffer-
stock” explanation of saving. In this model consumers are impatient and set average 
consumption growth at the level of income growth, while attempting to maintain an economic 
buffer to meet adverse economic events. This is not a standard precautionary motive model, 
but includes some of its reasoning. Fisher and Montalto (2011) examine household saving 
using the Survey of Consumer Finance, and find an asymmetry in saving behavior. Income 
below the reference level of the households causes a decrease in saving, whereas income 
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above does not increase saving. This illustrates that the behavior predicted by the 
precautionary motive might be partially correct and partially wrong. 
2.2.3 Life-cycle saving 
Bernheim (1987) shows that the data does not support life-cycle theories in the presence of 
non-discretionary annuities, e.g. Social Security and other forms of forced pension saving.  
By looking at bequest intentions and actual bequests, Hurd and Smith (2001), conclude that 
there is a close relationship, and that individuals update their view on the probability of 
leaving a bequest when given new information on their health or economic prospects. Based 
on this model of actual and anticipated bequest they conclude that people plan to dissave 
before they die. This is in accordance with life-cycle theories of saving. Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981) show that life-cycle models with certainty fail to predict the aggregate 
wealth pattern seen.  
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3 Theory  
3.1 Dynastic models of wealth accumulation 
One influential theory used to explain saving behavior and wealth accumulation is the 
dynastic model. In this type of model, the agent has a motivation to hand over wealth to the 
next generation. This theory can be modeled in various ways. One way to model the theory is 
the infinitely-lived agents’ model. An influential early example of such a model is found in 
Bewley (1977).  Here the dynasty of parents and their heirs is seen as a single economic agent 
utility function of the form: 
 [∑      
 
   
 ] 
Here the household maximizes the discounted sum of expected utilities until the end of time. 
By specifying an earning process, which often includes exogenous productivity shocks to the 
earnings of the households, an asset and capital market and a production technology, this type 
of model can give a household maximization problem and a market equilibrium. This in turns 
gives a given distribution of wealth when a set of parameters is added. Details on these types 
of models and their solutions are described in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). 
Another set of models are those with overlapping-generations. These models use elements 
from life-cycle models, and add a parental decision problem, where the parents are motivated 
by altruism towards their children. Becker and Tomes (1994) presents advanced versions of 
these models where asset accumulation, bequests, investment in human capital, and relative 
consumption levels influence saving behavior and the distribution of wealth. The model 
presented below is a much simplified version of those from that book. 
3.1.1 A simple model of dynastic saving decisions 
The purpose of this paper is not to simulate the saving behavior of all agents to reproduce the 
distribution found in the data. Therefore there is no need to specify a realistic, feature-rich 
model of the behavior of the agents. Instead what follows is a model that is as simple as 
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possible to illustrate some predictions of a dynastic model, in order to give an indication of 
what will be looked for in the data.  
An easy way to create a bequest motive is by including the utility of the heir in the utility 
function of the parent:  
                 
Here Up is the utility of the parent, Cp and Ch is the consumption of respectively the parent 
and heir, U(Ch) is the utility the heir gets for consumption Ch, and θ is the weight the parents 
puts on the utility of the heir. This is a simple static model, similar to one described by 
Altonji, et al. (1989), but contains the elements necessary to examine many aspects of the 
parent’s choice. To give a proper description of the choice faced, the model would have to 
take into account the intertemporal nature of the decision faced. 
The parent can choose to allocate his total life-time wealth Wp to his own consumption, and to 
the bequest given to his heir B, giving the following budget constraint for the parent: 
Wp=Cp+B. The heir has a life-time income of his own, Ih, so his budget constraint is Ch=Ih+B. 
Here it is assumed that the heir has no children of his own, and therefore will not allocate any 
part of his total wealth to bequests. This is obviously a large simplification, which would not 
be tenable if the model were to be used to simulate actual wealth inequality. The combined 
budget constraint of the parent and the heir is Cp +Ch= Wp+ Ih. If the heir’s income is 
unaffected by the size of the bequest, the parent will choose a consumption level and bequest 
level such that the marginal utility of his own income equals the discounted marginal utility of 
the child’s income: 
   
   
  
   
   
 
As long as the income of the heir is independent of the bequest given, the behavior of the 
parent and the heir maximizes the formers utility subject to the combined budget constraint. 
According to Altonji, et al. (1989) this outcome holds for other altruistic models as well. 
If the consumption level of the heirs enters into the utility function of the parents, the strength 
of the bequest motive will depend on how the consumption level of the parents and the 
children compare. If the children are expected to have a higher consumption level than the 
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parents, the bequest level will most likely be zero, since the marginal utility of consuming 
extra income exceeds the marginal utility of bequests. More formally, if Up’(Wp)≥θUh’(Ih), 
then B=0. This condition says that if the marginal utility for the parent when the whole wealth 
is consumed is higher than, or equal to, the discounted marginal utility for the heir when 
consuming only his own lifetime income, then the parent will not give a bequest. If the heir 
and the parent gain the same amount of utility from the same level of consumption, such that 
Up(x)= Uh(x) for any x, and θ≤1, this condition will be satisfied whenever Wp≤ Ih. If the θ is 
smaller than one, B=0, even for some values where the wealth of the parent exceeds the life-
time income of the heir. 
Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan (1997) explain the presence of a bequest motive by 
mean reverting income levels. If the parents have an above average level of lifetime income, 
mean reversion implies that the children will have a lower level of income than the parents. 
Mean-reverting income levels can be modeled using a Markow-chain. 
Ih=a+bIp+ε 
Ih, the life-time income of the heir, is determined by the level of the life-time income of the 
heir, Ip, the constants a and b, and a random error term ε, which is independent from Ip, with a 
mean value of zero. The parameter b can be seen as a measure of the persistence of income 
differences across generations. If b=0, then a indicates the average level of life-time income 
of in a cohort, and all departures from the average level are due to factors unrelated to the 
parents income (contained in the error term ε). If 0<b<1, then there is a positive correlation 
between the income of parents and their children, but the children are likely to be closer to the 
mean of their generation than their parents were to the mean of theirs. This model predicts 
that the bequest motive will only be relevant for rich households, and that the richer the 
household the higher the desired level of bequests is.  The higher the degree of mean 
reversion of lifetime income between parents and children, the higher the level of bequest 
would be. If the economic agents gain utility from their relative position in society, not just 
from the actual level of consumption, the negative effect economic growth has on the bequest 
motive would be diminished.  
Economic growth would cause parents to in average expect their children to be better off than 
themselves. If the level of consumption of the children drives the bequest motive, this would 
indicate that even with reversal to the mean of the income of the children, many parents with 
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above average income levels would not have a bequest motive. Voluntary bequests would 
therefore only be common among those so rich that even taking into account the expected 
level of economic growth, their children’s lifetime income would be expected to be lower 
than their own. Models where the bequest motive depends on the income of the children 
predict that factors that negatively affect the earning ability of the children will increase the 
level of bequests. If for example the children have low levels of completed education, this 
should lead to the parents saving more.  
3.1.2 Reverse altruism 
The altruistic link between parents and children can also run in the opposite direction, where 
children include the utility of their old-age parents in their utility function. Richer children 
would then help out their parents in old age. Children then become a saving vehicle for their 
parents. This effect is prominent in many poorer countries and is used as an explanation of the 
high level of fertility in many poor countries. Reverse altruism would indicate that individuals 
with children save less than those who are childless, since they can rely on their children for 
some of their life-cycle saving. If the altruism of the children is dependent on the 
consumption level of the parents, the argument about mean reversion of income would 
indicate that poor parents would save very little for bequests and perhaps reduce other forms 
of saving, whilst richer parents would still save. 
3.1.3 Trade-off between education spending and bequests 
If parents can through their behavior affect the earning potential of their offspring, this 
behavior will be a substitute for providing bequests. The most obvious way parents could do 
this is through spending on education. Parents could conceivably also forgo income through 
devoting extra time to raising their children, or in some other way face a trade-off between 
their own consumption and the consumption of their children. Since these trade-offs are hard 
to identify in the data, and even harder to quantify, this paper will limit itself to look at 
spending on education. To examine this question it is necessary to look at a model where the 
permanent income of the heir depends on the education level. It also makes sense to make the 
simple static model a two-period model to compare the returns. The parents utility function 
becomes: 
                                   , 
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where the utility of the parent at time t depends on the consumption at time t, and the utility of 
the heir at time t+1, discounted by the factor θ. The utility of the heir depends on his 
consumption, which is comprised of the value at time t+1 of the bequest set aside by the 
parent at time t, and his income. The level of income of the heir depends on the amount spent 
on his education, E. 
The parents budget constraint is Wp=Cp+B+Eh. There is a constant market rate of return r on 
the bequest set aside by the parent. The income of the heir increases with the level of 
spending on education, but with decreasing returns, so that 
   
   
  . As long as the return 
from spending on education is higher than the return on bequest, the level of bequests will be 
zero, regardless of how the trade-off between present consumption and the future 
consumption of the heir is. The parent will prefer spending on education rather than saving for 
bequests until 
  
  
  . Once the return on education spending is equal to the market return on 
bequests, the parent will be setting aside money for the bequest. Allowing for spending that 
increases the future income of the heir will therefore decrease the level of bequests.  
3.1.4 The effect of multiple children 
In a family with multiple children the parents should want to give a larger bequest to their 
most dimwitted and uneducated children, since they are likely to have a lower lifetime 
income. This behavior can disappear if the parents are preoccupied with concerns of equity 
and want to treat their children equally. How the number of children affects the level of 
bequests depends on the way the model is constructed. If additional children simply lead to 
more identical terms being added to the utility function, this will increase the total level of 
bequests given and thus the saving rate. Alternatively bequests to each child can be perfect 
substitutes, in which case the number of children will not increase the amount of money set 
aside for bequests. Individuals with more children might also have different preference 
parameters, leading to different and unpredictable effects of an increased number of children.  
3.1.5 Uncertain life-spans 
Uncertainty with regards to the time of death will, according to the theory, cause individuals 
to save extra in order to avoid an undesirably low level of consumption in old age. This can 
cause the parents to cause bequests that are not planned, so-called accidental bequests. A high 
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risk aversion leads to a high saving rate in order to avoid an unexpectedly low level of 
consumption in old age. This could result in the expected level of accidental bequests to be 
equal to or higher than the desired level of voluntary bequests. If this is the case, then it would 
not be possible to distinguish between an individual with a bequest motive and one without a 
bequest motive, since the saving level would be identical. If a portion of the wealth held is in 
annuities, this reduces the risk of an unacceptably low level of consumption in old age. 
Annuities are assets that yield a set annual return as long as the owner is alive, but that are not 
bequeathable. With perfect markets for annuities, there would be no reason for individuals to 
engage in precautionary saving when faced with uncertain life-spans, and therefore all wealth 
held in other asset classes would be an indication of a bequest motive. Most individuals do 
not annuitize a large proportion of their wealth in old age. This can probably be explained by 
the fact that the market for annuities is far from perfect, and cannot be taken as proof of a 
widespread and strong bequest motive. An important source of annuitized wealth is Social 
Security, and other forms of forced pension saving. Since Social Security covers a smaller 
proportion of ones pre-retirement income when that income is higher, this should indicate that 
richer individuals will save more from precautionary reasons than poorer households. 
Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002) propose that the increased annuitized share of resources for the 
elderly decreases savings and accidental bequests, and that this is an important explanation for 
the increase in wealth inequality seen during the last decades. 
3.1.6 Joy of giving 
A bequest motive can also be modeled by an altruistic link between parents and children that 
is unrelated to the level of the latter’s consumption. These models can be called “joy of 
giving”, or “warm glow” models of bequests, and where first introduced in Andreoni (1989). 
De Nardi (2004) utilizes a model where the giving of bequests is a luxury good, meaning that 
the share of income devoted to bequests increases as income increases. The problem with the 
simpler joy of giving models is that they are more ad hoc in their assumptions. Since there are 
no external factors that influence the desired level of bequests, the models can explain 
virtually any level of bequests found in the data, simply by varying the level of the key 
parameters. This detracts from their predictive power. The simplicity of these models is also 
their virtue, since they are less dependent on the specific choices made in constructing the 
relationship between the level of consumption of the children and the parents.  
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3.1.7 Bequest motives directed at others than children 
To whom individuals wish to give bequests is an important question. In this paper it is 
assumed that individuals only wish to give bequests to their children. It is possible that 
bequests to more distant relatives also enter into the utility functions of individuals, or that 
there is utility gained from other types of bequests, such as charitable giving. If these factors 
enter into the utility function of both the childless and those with children, the total desired 
level of bequests could still be higher for those who have children depending on the form of 
the utility functions. In this case the use of children as an indicator of the bequest motive will 
still give results, but will understate the actual magnitude of the bequest motive. However if 
the preferences of the childless and those with children differed systematically in such a way 
as to create an equivalent bequest motive directed at others, it is impossible to use children to 
determine whether there is a bequest motive.  
  
  
14 
 
4 Empirical strategy and variables 
4.1 Description of the data 
The data used in this study comes from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. This study is 
the longest running longitudinal household survey in the world, having started in 1968. This 
paper uses demographic and income information from the period between 1997 and 2009, and 
wealth levels from 1999 to 2009. The survey is biennial over this period, and gives detailed 
information on a wide range of questions. The same several thousand households are 
surveyed each time, and the data can be broken down to the level of individuals. 
According to Davies and Shorrocks (2000), the information gained form surveys on the 
wealth distribution is often less reliable than comparable information on income, due to the 
problems of sampling individuals from the far right end of the wealth distribution. Some 
surveys, such as the SCF deal with this problem by oversampling the wealthy. This approach 
is not used in the PSID. While the panel nature of the PSID makes it ideal for following 
individuals over time to identify variables such as the presence of adult children, the lack of 
accurate information on the wealthiest section of society is a drawback when studying the 
bequest motive. 
4.2 Goal of analysis 
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to examine whether there is a link between the 
accumulation of wealth through saving and having children. If there is a significant positive 
relationship, this would offer support dynastic theories of wealth accumulation. If no 
relationship is found, or the relationship is negative, such that having children predicts a lower 
saving rate, this would indicate that the bequest motive does not play a major role in 
determining the level of wealth of households or the wealth inequality of society as a whole. 
In addition other variables of interest will be looked at in order to discuss the support found in 
the data for various theories of saving behavior. The presence or absence of a bequest motive 
cannot easily be examined by looking at bequests directly. This is because most theories of 
saving and wealth accumulation predict some level of bequests. As previously discussed both 
life-cycle saving and precautionary saving can be expected to give rise to accidental bequests 
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if the time of death is unknown, which it is in the real world, and if insurance markets and 
markets for annuities are imperfect.  
Theories of wealth accumulation that emphasize other motivations, such as wealth being held 
in order to keep ownership of a business or because the level of wealth itself provides utility, 
would also predict bequests. These bequests would not be accidental, since they would be 
predictable for the economic agent, but they would be incidental in the sense that they are not 
desired. 
Both precautionary saving and life-cycle saving models predict increasing dissaving in old 
age, and smaller and smaller accidental bequests the older the economic agent is. Whilst this 
prediction makes it possible to examine the extent to which bequests are accidental by looking 
at the age-profile of bequests, there is no similar way to distinguish between wanted and 
incidental bequests. In order to examine whether the bequest motive is important in 
determining saving and wealth levels, it is necessary to compare individuals that have 
children with individuals that do not have children. Using panel data on wealth levels it is 
possible to compute saving rates for individuals, and estimate what factors affect the saving 
rate. 
4.3 Dependent variable 
4.3.1 Defining saving rates 
Saving can be defined in various ways. One way is to define saving simply as the change in 
wealth. This is the definition used throughout this paper, and it includes changes in the level 
of housing wealth and increases in the values of financial assets. An alternative way of 
defining saving would be to look only at income actively set aside for the purpose of saving, 
and the excluding unrealized capital gains. This could be called active saving. The way to 
calculate this level of saving would be to look at the difference between ordinary income and 
consumption. Since the data used does not contain accurate estimates of consumption for the 
years examined this approach is not used. This approach is used by Dynnan et. al (2002). 
The advantage of looking at active saving could be that households do not fully take into 
account increases or decreases in the values of assets in deciding their level of saving. This 
could be because of lack of accurate information on the value at any given time of their assets, 
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because of limited rationality, or because of volatility of the value of assets. If the values of 
some types of assets vary considerably a measure of saving that relies on the total value of 
wealth at two points in time might overstate or understate the level of saving for that period. If 
the asset allocation differs between groups, this could cause the data to erroneously indicate 
different saving rates. An example of this could be comparing saving rates of richer and 
poorer households. Richer households generally have a larger proportion of their wealth in the 
stock market. If the period looked at is one where the stock market did unusually well or 
especially poorly, this would overstate or understate the saving rate of the rich compared to 
the poor. Excluding volatile assets from the calculation of saving is unsatisfactory precisely 
because these assets are an important source of saving for a large number of households. To 
deal with the effect of volatile assets on estimated saving rates, this paper looks at saving rates 
for various periods and for periods of different lengths. Specifically the use of panel data in 
the main analysis means that the short term volatility of asset values should not have a too 
large effect on the aggregate relationship found between the saving rates and the variables of 
interest. Furthermore the proportion of the wealth held in the form of stocks is used as a 
control variable. 
4.3.2 How the saving rate is calculated 
The basic way the saving rate is calculated is by subtracting the wealth level at the beginning 
of the saving period from the wealth level at the end of the period and dividing it by a 
measure of income, which is discussed in more detail below. All dollar values are adjusted for 
inflation, and are measured in 2007-dollars. The adjustment for inflation uses the values from 
the St. Louis Fed GDP deflator (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt). All 
values are assumed to be from the second quarter of their relevant year, as this is the most 
common period for the interviews in the PSID. Adjusting for inflation makes saving rates, 
wealth levels and income levels from different years more easily comparable. 
4.3.3 Basing saving rates on one-year or multi-year income 
The wealth level is reported at two-year intervals in the data. This means that the saving 
periods looked at are also two years long. However there is only a single measure of income 
for each two year period, which is the total household income for the year in between the 
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wealth measurements. This is because the survey asks for the current level of wealth, but the 
previous year’s level of income and because the survey is biennial. 
This means that it is not possible to calculate a “true” saving rate based on the change in 
wealth over a time period as a proportion of the total income of that period. For example for 
the period from 2007 to 2009, the PSID contains wealth values for the year 2007 from the 
2007 survey, wealth values for the year 2009 from that years survey, and income levels from 
the years 2006 and 2008. Ideally the income from 2007 would also be available, so that the 
saving rate could be defined as the ratio between the change in wealth from 2007 to 2009, and 
the sum of the incomes in 2007 and 2008. 
Since this is not possible, two other definitions of the saving rate have been used. The first 
relies on a measure of permanent income. The average yearly income between the years 1996 
(from the 1997 survey) and 2008 is calculated. Since there is data for every other year, the 
mean is calculated based on seven values. This measure of permanent income, multiplied by 
two, is then used as the denominator in the saving rate. 
Whether this is a good approximation on permanent income depends on the persistence of 
income shocks. If income shocks are highly persistent, more data would be required to create 
a good measure of the permanent income. Income for most individuals follows a set life-
cycle, with lower incomes when young, increasing incomes towards middle age, and 
decreasing incomes in old age, especially after retirement. This means that this measure of 
permanent income is affected by the age of the individual in question. Someone who is either 
young at the beginning of the measurement period, or old at the end of it, will get an 
artificially low level of permanent income compared to someone who is in his prime earning 
years throughout the period.  
The second definition of the saving takes the income in the year between the two 
measurements of wealth, multiplies it by two, and uses it as the denominator when calculating 
the saving rate. If the income during the “missing” year is more highly correlated with the 
income the following year, than with the measure of permanent income, implying a high 
persistence of income shocks, then this second definition will give values for the saving rate 
closer to the “true” saving rate. 
4.3.4 With or without housing equity 
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A particularly problematic source of wealth is housing wealth. Housing is a relatively illiquid 
asset, with high transaction costs, making it less likely that households readjust their wealth 
portfolios and saving behavior following changes in housing prices. The availability of house 
equity loans makes the illiquid nature of housing wealth less of an issue. Engelhardt (1996) 
finds using PSID data from the 1980s that housing appreciation, which as it is an increase in 
wealth can be seen as a form of saving, does not affect non-housing saving, when the change 
in housing value is positive, but does affect non-housing saving when the housing value 
decreases (a form of negative saving). Campbell and Cocco (2005) however find large effects 
on consumption for some groups of increasing house prices. Recent experiences also show 
clearly that housing values are more volatile than previously thought. Whether housing wealth 
should be treated the same as other forms of wealth depends on whether households treat their 
housing wealth in similar ways as there non-housing wealth, and on how important housing 
wealth is as a saving vehicle for households. 
Housing is not only an asset owned for saving purposes, housing is also a consumption good. 
When house prices increase, this not only increases the wealth of house owners, but also 
increases the cost of enjoying a similar level of “consumption of housing” elsewhere. This is 
especially the case if rents follow house prices, as they can be expected to do in the long term 
(Gallin 2008). Said differently, when there is a general increase in house prices, as opposed to 
an increase only of a particular house, a house owner who has experienced an increase in 
value of his house can only consume that wealth or allocate it to some other asset class if he is 
willing to consume a lower amount of housing good. Other assets do not have this property.  
Excluding the value of housing is not entirely satisfactory either, since households might use 
their savings on acquiring more expensive houses or on making investments that increases the 
value of their house. Also, the value of housing might be an important consideration when 
planning bequests for descendants. Since it is possible to take out loans against the value of 
housing, it is possible to consume housing wealth without selling. This form of dissaving is 
important to include when determining whether there is a bequest motive in the saving 
behavior of the elderly. This paper mainly uses estimates of saving rates based on wealth 
levels that include housing. However wealth levels excluding housing equity are also 
examined to determine whether the conclusions are sensitive to the type of saving used.  
4.3.5 Saving with or without large inheritance and gifts 
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The PSID contains data on inheritance and gifts larger than $ 10 000 received in the period 
between measurements of wealth levels. These sums are not included as income. A sudden 
large gift can be seen as an example of transitory income. Economic theory predicts that such 
a gift will largely be saved by the recipients. Their effect is therefore to substantially increase 
the saving rate for the individuals and households who receive them.  
If households expect to receive inheritances from their parents, but the timing of the 
inheritance is unknown, the households can be expected to treat the future expected 
inheritance like a form of illiquid wealth, and take account of it in their saving behavior both 
before and after the inheritance is received.  
In order to avoid complications related to how gifts and inheritance should be treated, they are 
not added to the income measures, and are subtracted from the change in wealth in the main 
analysis. 
4.3.6 Eliminating negative income values 
Income levels in the data can be both positive and negative. Negative levels are caused by 
losses from businesses or farms, alternatively they could be caused by errors in the data. The 
income can also be zero for some years if the household is living only off previous savings. 
Because the income enters as the denominator in the saving rate, the saving rate is not defined 
when the income is zero. When the income is negative, applying the normal definition of the 
saving rate does not work. A household with negative reported income will erroneously be 
considered to be saving if the change in wealth is negative and be considered to be dissaving 
when the change in wealth is positive.  
If the measure of income included all income, including capital gains, for the whole saving 
period, it would not be possible for a household to have negative income and positive saving. 
However the data in the PSID only contains income levels for every other year. This means 
that there could be households that have a net positive income for the two year period over 
which saving is measured, but have a negative income in the year when income is recorded. 
In order to avoid spurious saving rates caused by negative income values and undefined 
saving rates caused by zero incomes, all observations where the income is not strictly positive 
are dropped from the analysis. This is more problematic for the saving rate calculated with the 
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one year income, than for the saving rate that uses permanent income. While it is plausible 
that a household has a negative income one year, an average negative income over a 12 year 
period is not realistic. If a person has a negative average income there must either be a very 
large variation in the income, such that losses one or more years are larger than the positive 
income in the remaining years, or there must be errors in the data. 
4.3.7 Removing top-coded incomes and wealth levels 
In the PSID the wealth and income levels are top coded for very high levels. If the wealth 
level is above $ 999,999,997, the recorded wealth level is simply recorded as being $ 
999 999 997. Incomes above $ 9,999,999 are similarly top coded. This is a familiar problem 
in the literature on income and wealth (e.g. Gottschalk 1997), and is sometimes dealt with by 
multiplying all top coded values by 1.5 or 2. This is unsatisfactory in general, but is especially 
so when the values are used to calculate changes in wealth and saving rates. A household with 
top coded wealth levels in two periods will be registered as having zero saving in all cases. 
The calculated saving of a household with one wealth level that is top coded will depend 
entirely on how the top coded values are treated. A person with top coded income will, if the 
income is not adjusted, be registered as having an artificially high saving rate. This will cause 
a spurious positive relationship between saving rate and high income. Because of these 
problems observations with top coded values are dropped. This is not entirely satisfactory. 
One of the key predictions of many dynastic saving models is that the bequest motive and 
saving rate is higher for the very richest households. Furthermore explaining the very right-
skewed nature of the wealth distribution is important for theories of wealth accumulation.  
4.3.8 Eliminating extreme values of saving rates  
When computing the saving rate in the manner described above, some anomalous saving rates 
appear. While the majority of the saving rates have reasonable values, the values of the saving 
rate used in the panel data analysis vary between – 187 and 1052. It is not plausible that an 
individual saves more than a thousand times his average income in a given year, perhaps 
except if he has just won the lottery. If the saving rate used in the analysis included all income 
in the two year saving period, without any error, then it would be impossible to have a saving 
rate in excess of 1. However due to imperfections in the saving rate, it is not possible to say 
with certainty that saving rates in excess of a given value are errors. Nonetheless extremely 
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high rates are either signs of errors in the data, or that the individuals in question have some 
extremely unusual feature (such as a propensity for winning lotteries). Because the very large 
saving rates can have an undue effect on the results, all saving rates above 1 are excluded 
from the analysis. This corresponds to excluding all values that are above the 92
nd
 percentile 
of the distribution of saving rates. 
This is a somewhat arbitrary cut-off point, due to the imperfect nature of the calculated saving 
rate, but it is the least arbitrary possible cut-off point. There is no theoretical lower limit to 
how negative the saving rate can be, even if there are no imperfections in the data or 
calculations. This is because it is possible for someone to consume a large multiple of their 
income from their wealth. Very high negative values are still suspicious, as they can be 
caused by errors and will have a large effect on the results. Therefore the most extreme 
negative values are excluded. In order to make the cut-off symmetric all values below the 8
th
 
percentile of the distribution of saving rates are eliminated. 
One possible source of extreme values is measurement error. Measurement error is fairly 
common in the PSID and similar surveys. In Pischke (1995) it is proposed that the 
measurement error found in the PSID comes from underreporting of transitory earnings, and a 
random component. Underreporting of transitory income would be expected to lead to 
overrated saving rates. Duncan and Hill (1985) estimate that a little under 20% of the 
variability of earnings in the PSID is due to errors. Furthermore this error is correlated with 
many regressors that are frequently used. This is problematic, and adds an extra reason to 
exclude those observations that are most likely to be affected by errors. If extreme values are 
more likely to erroneous, as it is proposed here that they are, then they should be excluded. 
4.4 Key independent variables 
4.4.1 Children and adult children 
The primary purpose of the analysis in this paper is to quantify the effect of children on 
saving rates and wealth accumulation, in order to test the importance of the bequest motive. 
The theory is that if giving bequests to ones children is important, this would cause the saving 
rate of parents to be higher than childless individuals.  
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However individuals with and without children can be expected to differ in more ways than 
simply whether they are motivated to save for bequests. Most importantly, raising children 
costs a lot of money, which means that households that raise children have a less income 
available for saving. If this effect is larger than the effect of a bequest motive, it could lead to 
erroneously concluding that do not save for bequests. In order to deal with this problem, the 
key variable is an indicator of whether the individual has adult children. Adult children are 
defined as children that are older than 18 years old. While it is possible that children still rely 
on their parents economically after entering adulthood, it is also likely that this dependence 
becomes smaller and smaller as the children become older. 18 years is a convenient cut-off 
point between childhood and adulthood. Parents are likely to have lower levels of wealth even 
after having raised children if the cost of raising children causes lower saving while the 
children where young. The effect of this on the saving rate of parents with adult children is 
not obvious. On one hand lower levels of wealth have sometimes been associated with lower 
saving rates. The level of wealth at the start of the saving period is used as a control variable, 
and can potentially remove this effect. However, it is also possible that parents with adult 
children need to engage in catch-up saving when they no longer need to provide for their 
children. If the wealth level of parents with children that have recently entered adulthood are 
lower than the parents would choose based purely on life-cycle and precautionary saving 
motives if they were childless, this could cause extra saving that is incorrectly attributed to the 
bequest motive. Because of this, even if a strong relationship is found between saving level 
and the presence of adult children, this does not conclusively show that the bequest motive is 
important. 
Parents and non-parents are likely to differ in other, less obvious ways than whether they have 
to pay for the upbringing of children or not. As many of these differences as possible are 
taken into account by including various control variables. It is possible that there are hidden 
differences that are not accounted for. These differences could cause the conclusion regarding 
the bequest motive to be wrong. This risk is impossible to avoid entirely. 
The indicator for adult children takes two forms in the analysis. In the one that is used for 
most of the analysis, the indicator indicates that the individual has adult children, and no 
children below the age of 18. This indicator can be called the exclusive adult children 
indicator. The second form indicates that the individual has adult children, but does not 
exclude individuals who have both adult and young children. This indicator will be called the 
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inclusive indicator. The reason for basing the analysis mainly on the exclusive adult children 
indicator is that parents who only have adult children have the advantage of being similar to 
childless individuals in practically every respect, except having offspring that could give rise 
to a bequest motive. Since the presence of dependents in the household is controlled for, as 
explained below, the inclusive indicator can nonetheless function in a satisfactory manner. 
The advantage of the inclusive indicator is that more individuals satisfy its condition. This is 
especially the case for lower age groups. 
The analysis bases itself on the presence or absence of adult children, not the number of adult 
children. There are several reasons for this. Firstly there is no clear prediction from the theory 
on bequest motives regarding how the bequest motive changes as the number of children 
increases. Whether a higher number of adult children leads to more money set aside for 
bequests depends on the details of the model used. Secondly, even if a higher number of 
children leads to a higher desired bequest level, it is unlikely that this relationship is linear. If 
there is a decreasing marginal utility from future bequests, going from one adult child to two, 
will not double the desired level of bequests regardless of how the bequest to the extra child 
enters into the utility function. Dealing with a non-linear relationship between the desired 
level bequest and the number of adult children could be done by creating dummy variables for 
each number of children. However this could make it difficult to get significant results, 
without adding much to the quality of the analysis. Quantifying the precise effect of the 
number of children on the bequest level is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore no 
attempt is made to use dummy variables for the number of adult children.  
Individuals that are expecting to become parents at some point in the future, but are currently 
childless could be expected to have a similar saving behavior as individuals with adult 
children. Both groups share the characteristics of potentially wanting to save for bequests and 
of not having to spend money on raising children. This would have the advantage of including 
younger individuals in the analysis of the bequest motive. No attempt is made to examine this 
effect. One reason for this is that it is not possible to identify individuals that expect to have 
children in the future. Due to the nature of the panel data, it is possible to identify individuals 
who get children after a saving period. However, whether these children were expected cannot 
be known. It is also impossible to identify individuals who expect to have children, but for 
some reason do not manage. The indicators of adult children base themselves on reported live 
births to individuals and the year these births occurred. This does not control for children who 
24 
 
have died after birth. Since the mortality rate is relatively low until individuals reach a fairly 
high age, this is not a major problem. As noted previously, spending on education, or other 
spending that can increase the earning potential of children, is a substitute for giving bequests. 
This is especially important when the desired level of bequests is low, and the return to 
education spending is high. Education spending on adult children is not controlled for. This is 
a potential weakness in the analysis. 
4.4.2 Dependents 
Dependents are defined in this analysis as individuals who live in the household, and cannot 
be expected to provide income. In practice, these are children that live in the household, and 
are usually the children of others in the household. The number of dependents in the 
household can be expected to negatively affect the disposable income, and thus the saving 
rate. Therefore it is important to control for this. Furthermore, when the exclusive indicator of 
adult children is used, not controlling for the effect of dependents would negatively affect the 
saving rate of those who do not satisfy the criteria of the indicator, and thus risk 
overestimating the effect of having adult children. When the inclusive indicator is used, there 
is a difference within this group between those that still raise underage children, and those 
who do not. Including the number of dependents in the analysis is therefore important to 
identify the proper role of the presence of adult children. 
4.4.3 Income and wealth 
The income level of the household is an obvious factor contributing to the saving rate. This is 
both because people with temporarily high incomes can be expected to save more, and 
because it is common to find in the literature that saving rates increases with measures of 
permanent income. The log of income is taken to diminish the effect of extreme values. This 
has the effect of excluding those with negative incomes that are not already excluded through 
the construction of the saving rate variable. These are those with long-run negative incomes 
when short run saving rate measure is used, or short-run negative incomes when long-run 
saving measure is used. This is not necessarily a problem as the cause of negative incomes 
can be errors in the data. This is especially true when the long-run income is negative, 
something which is difficult to explain.  
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When the form of regression allows it the measure of income used is the time-invariant mean 
income level, with the standard deviation of the income added as an extra explanatory 
variable to test the greater saving needs of those with highly volatile incomes. When time-
invariant income levels cannot be used, the difference between the income in the relevant year 
and the average income level is included as a variable. 
The level of wealth itself is a potentially important factor in determining the saving rate. Here 
the log is not taken. Negative or zero values of wealth are very common, and excluding all 
observations where the wealth level is negative would severely impair the quality of the 
analysis.  Alternative ways of transforming the wealth variable, such as setting all negative 
and zero values to a value close to zero and then taking the log, or using the hyperbolic sine 
transformation of wealth, as described in Burbidge et al (1988) and Pence (2006), has been 
considered but not done since this makes it more difficult to interpret the meaning of the 
result.  
4.4.4 Other controlling variables 
The life-cycle theory of saving predicts that saving will vary considerably with age. The 
relationship between age and saving is not expected to be linear. For young individuals, the 
income is usually lower than the average income over the lifetime. This should lead to 
negative saving in order to smooth consumption. Alternatively, if the young individuals are 
credit constrained, this should lead to very low levels of saving in aggregate, with most of the 
saving in this age group being done by people with anomalous income-age profiles. As people 
age, their income usually increases, leading to increased saving, especially in order to prepare 
for old age. After retirement the income of most individuals falls. This leads to a lower saving 
rate, and quite possibly dissaving. In order to deal with the expected non- linear nature of the 
relationship between age and saving, age is included in the analysis as in the form of age 
dummies. The age distribution is divided into seven categories: those 75 years old or older, 
those younger than 25, and five groups in between, each consisting of 10 years. Dummies are 
created for each of those groups except the youngest groups. 
The labor market status of the individuals is likely to be a major factor determining their 
saving rates. Especially whether the individual is unemployed or retired is likely to be 
important. Whether the individual is married or widowed is also controlled for, as is the 
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number of years of completed education. The proportion of wealth held in the form of stocks 
is also used as an independent variable. 
4.4.5 Interaction effects 
To see how the effect of having adult children varies with income an interaction variable 
between income and the indicator of children is used. 
4.4.6 Missing variables 
The analysis of this paper does not include every variable that one would wish to include. One 
variable that would be valuable to include is the spending by the parents on their children’s 
education. As described in the Theory-chapter, spending that increases the income of the heirs 
can be a substitute for saving money for bequests. The health status and mortality risk of the 
individuals are also potentially important variables that are not included in the analysis. The 
health status affects the expected level of spending on health care, an important source of 
precautionary saving. Mortality risk determines the expected life-time, which is also 
important for precautionary saving, and for the probability of leaving accidental bequests. A 
further type of variable that could be included in the analysis is indicators of risk aversion or 
other forms of preference heterogeneity. Hendricks (2007) uses heterogeneity in the discount 
rate to account for some of the wealth inequality observed in the data, and to explain the 
wealth inequality between households with similar earnings. In general there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity in the data, and a significant proportion of the saving behavior remains 
unexplained. Behavioral indicators that can account for some of this unexplained variation 
would enrich the explanations of wealth inequality. 
4.5 Defining the sample 
In the PSID every individual in every household is recorded as one individual observation. 
This includes children. Income and wealth is however recorded at the household level, with 
the values for the household being given to each individual observation. This means that a 
child would be recorded with the income of the household, and with being himself childless. 
This is obviously untenable. Therefore all individual observations that are not the head of the 
household, the wife of the head or the cohabiting partner of the head are excluded. The 
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reasoning behind including these individuals and only them is that they all take some part in 
the allocation of labor (in the workplace and the home) and saving decisions, and are 
therefore relevant. Furthermore the “child-status” of a head and a wife need not be identical. 
If one has an adult child, while the other does not, this can be expected to contribute to the 
saving decisions in the same manner as in a household where both have adult children, but too 
a someone smaller extent. Allowing the couple with different child-status to count as two 
observations with the same income and saving deals with this issue. This does however mean 
that the income of a household with a head and a wife is “counted twice” when distributions 
of income are calculated, which could for example change the cut-off points for different 
quintiles. This is not really a problem for the analysis in this paper since examining the 
precise distribution of income is not the goal. When income quintiles are used as independent 
variables, this is to look at the general relationship between income and saving. A slight shift 
of the cut-off points is not troubling.  
Adults that are not heads or wives are also excluded alongside children. These adults can be 
family-members such as siblings or parents, or simply room-mates. These adults could 
conceivably contribute to the income of the household, and have unique child-statuses. By 
that reasoning they should be included. However it is assumed that they are less important 
economic-decision makers in the household. There presence could be included as a control 
variable in the regression, but this has not been done, since the category is too diverse to be 
useful, elderly parents and room-mates are not really comparable, and the number of 
individuals is quite small. 
4.6 Main regression  
The main analysis is based on a panel regression. The panel consists of individual saving rates 
between the years 1999 and 2001, 2001 and 2003, 2003 and 2005, 2005 and 2007, and 2007 
and 2009. Because the individuals in the analysis belong to households and families, there is 
clustering in the data. This requires the use robust standard errors. There are several variables 
in the analysis that are time-invariant, especially permanent income (or rather its proxy, 
average income between 1997 and 2009) and the variance of income and wealth. In a fixed 
effect model, these variables cannot be used. This means that a random effect model is 
preferable. A random effect model is also preferable for the usual reason that it provides a 
more efficient estimator, and because since it reduces the effect of measurement error through 
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averaging variable observations. In contrast the fixed effect model can aggravate 
measurement error since individual intercepts are suppressed and the variation that is looked 
at is within individuals, which can be contaminated by measurement error (Kennedy 2008). 
However a random effect model is only appropriate when it is an unbiased estimator, which in 
turn requires that the total influence of the unmeasured omitted variables is not correlated 
with the variables that are included (Kennedy 2008). Saving behavior usually contains a large 
amount of unobserved heterogeneity. The number of explanatory variables is small, while the 
underlying variation in saving rates is large. Since the saving rate is defined in this study as 
the change in wealth relative to a measure of income, there are many unobserved potential 
factors that could affect the saving rate. Assuming that there are no correlation between the 
excluded variables and those included is not satisfactory. Therefore it is necessary to test 
whether at random effects model is appropriate.  
Normally the Hausman test would be appropriate for testing whether the random effects 
estimate is unbiased. The Hausman test requires that one estimate is known to be unbiased. In 
this case the fixed effect model satisfies this condition. However it is also necessary that the 
estimator being tested is fully efficient. This condition is not satisfied in the present case 
because of clustering, which requires robust standard errors.  
In order to deal with this a separate set of regressions are run where only observations for 
current heads of each household are included. This should reduce the clustering of the error 
terms, meaning that a random effects model is efficient, which again means that a standard 
Hausman test can be applied. 
The results from this test then decide what form of regression to use in the subsequent 
analysis. The regressions then use the whole sample as defined above and employ cluster 
robust errors. The various alternative forms of the dependent variable and the adult child 
variable are used in separate regressions to examine whether the results differ from those 
found in the main analysis. 
4.7 Quantile regression of long saving rate 
To supplement the analysis of the panel data, a median regression of a longer saving rate is 
run, as well as a regression on the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentile and an OLS-regression with cluster 
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robust standard errors. Here the saving rate is defined as the change in wealth over the eight-
year period from 1999 to 2007, divided by a measure of the income from this period (the 
average income described earlier multiplied by eight). The period is chosen to start and end at 
as similar points in the business cycle as possible, as described in more detail in the Summary 
Statistics chapter. 
Since median regressions are less sensitive to extreme values (Cameron and Trivedi 2010), 
and since there are fewer extreme values for long term saving rates, this regression does not 
use data where the top and bottom part of the distribution is removed. The age values are 
defined as the age at the beginning of the period. In order to be included in the analysis an 
individual must be either, a household head, a wife, or a cohabiting partner at the beginning of 
the period. The adult child variable is defined as those that have adult children at the 
beginning of the period and at no point during the saving period have dependents in the 
household. The dependents variable is defined as those with dependents at some point during 
the saving period.  
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5 Summary statistics 
5.1 Saving rates in different periods 
5.1.1 Comparing different definitions of the saving rate 
Table 1 summarizes the saving rates in all two-year periods from 1999 to 2009. Comparing 
the different values found for different definitions of the saving rate is interesting in itself, but 
also gives an indication of which definition is most reliable for the regression analysis.  
Comparing saving rate 1 and 2, shows that rate number two, where the saving rate is defined 
using the income in the middle year of the period, gives more erratic results. This can be seen 
in the saving rates for 1999 to 2001, 2001 to 2003 and 2007 to 2009, where the mean saving 
rate is negative, and smaller than the median. This is likely because some households have 
low incomes in some years, and in those years dissave considerably. With incomes close to 
zero, this gives very high rates as the income is in denominator. Over time the income level 
evens out, meaning that the negative values on the saving rate for those same households are 
smaller, and therefore have a smaller effect on the overall mean. The period from 2007 to 
2009 gives a particularly low negative value, with a mean saving rate of -8. This was a period 
where most households dissaved; the median saving rate is negative regardless of what form 
of saving rate one looks at. The proportion of households with both large negative wealth 
changes and low incomes must be large in this period to give such an extremely low value for 
the mean saving rate. 
There are few obvious differences between the first and third measure of saving rates that 
indicate that one is superior to the other. The mean and median is lower when inheritances 
received during the saving period are subtracted, which is entirely as expected. The standard 
deviations are similar. 
5.1.2 Comparing different saving periods 
The general dissaving seen in the period from 2007 form 2009 is most likely due to 
decreasing house prices and losses on financial assets. That the former plays an important role 
can be seen by comparing the saving rate that includes housing wealth (nr. 1), with the 
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equivalent rate without housing wealth (nr. 4). The saving rate is considerably higher for this 
period when housing is excluded.  
The two periods with the lowest median saving rates according to all four measures are the 
period form 2001 to 2003 and the period from 2007 to 2009. According to the National 
Bureau of Economic Research the US economy was in recession for 8 months between March 
2001 and November 2001
1
, and for 18 months between December 2007 and June 2009
2
. This 
is clearly seen in the data. The 2001 wave of interviews were carried out between precisely 
March 2001 and November 2011, with a majority carried out before June. The 2007 
interviews were carried out between March and December of that year, and the 2009 
interviews between February and December, both of these had the majority carried out before 
June. This means that for most households surveyed the 2007-2009 saving period was 
concurrent with a deep and long recession. The 2001-2003 period does not match as well to 
that recession, but if the households are slightly backwards looking in reporting their wealth 
to the survey, the low median saving rate for that can easily be explained by the recession. 
The strong effect of the business cycle on the saving rate can be explained in two ways. It can 
be claimed that it shows the effect of fluctuations in asset prices on the saving rate when it is 
calculated through the change in wealth level. This can be seen as a criticism, if it implies that 
outside forces rather than economic decisions made by the households that decide the level of 
the calculated saving rate. This criticism has some validity, but it is met by using panel data, 
which includes saving rates at many different times, and by using more long term saving 
rates. Both of these approaches are taken here. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that 
the factors that influence the rates are not visible in years when the economy is doing poorly. 
It is not a good argument for arbitrarily excluding some asset classes from the calculation of 
wealth levels and saving rates. This can be seen by looking at saving rate 4, which is less 
affected by the recession in 2007-9, but is considerably more affected by the recession in 
2001. The second, more optimistic reading of the statistics is that the effect of recessions on 
saving rates lends support to precautionary saving theory. Recessions are times of 
unemployment and decreased income growth; that saving rates are lower in these periods is 
entirely as expected. 
  
                                                 
1
 http://www.nber.org/cycles/july2003.html 
2
 http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html 
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Yearly rates 
1. Saving 
rate based 
on long-
term income 
(incl. house 
value, excl. 
inheritance) 
2. Saving 
rate based 
on short-
term income 
(incl. house 
value, excl. 
inheritance) 
3. Saving 
rate based 
on long-
term income 
(incl. house 
value, and 
inheritance) 
4. Saving 
rate based 
on long-
term income 
excluding 
housing 
Wealth level 
at the end 
(*beginning) 
of the period, 
in 2007-$, 
including 
housing 
From 
1999 
to 
2007 
Median 0.015 NA 0.213 0.001 34,274* 
Mean 0.077 NA 0.096 0.043 175,921* 
SD 1.00 NA 1.01 0.95  
From 
1999 
to 
2001 
Median 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.000 37,330 
Mean 0.009 -0.351 0.022 -0.013 189,330 
From 
2001 
to 
2003 
Median 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.000 38,734 
Mean 0.003 -0.252 0.019 -0.021 187,825 
From 
2003 
to 
2005 
Median 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.000 42,246 
Mean 0.208 1.383 0.223 0.126 226,093 
From 
2005 
to 
2007 
Median 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.002 43500 
Mean 0.076 1.383 0.093 0.059 255081 
From 
2007 
to 
2009 
Median -0.056 -0.060 -0.052 -0.013 27,591 
Mean -0.104 -8.338 -0.090 0.044 230,029 
Table 1: Saving rates and wealth levels in different periods 
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The effect of recession on saving rates gives a reason to be careful in deciding the periods 
when studying long-term saving rates. In this study the period from 1999 to 2007 has been 
chosen in order to match approximately a period between the peaks of business-cycles. 
5.1.3 General conclusions 
A general conclusion from the saving rates in table 1 is that the mean tends to be higher than 
the median. This indicates that the distribution of saving rates is right-skewed. This is in 
accordance with other studies that show that most people save little, while a smaller number 
save more. The exception to this pattern is in the recession years. For those periods the mean 
saving rate is lower than the median. This can probably be explained by large losses on 
financial assets taken by individuals with significant investments in volatile assets. 
5.2 Long-term saving rates with or without children 
by income quintiles 
Table 2 gives saving rates broken down by income quintile (long-run income) and by absence 
or presence of children. The group “with adult children only “ is comprised of those who are 
registered as having adult children at the beginning and end of the period, and who do not 
have any dependents in the household during the saving period. The category “with dependent 
children” includes everyone who has children in the household at any point during the period. 
The group “without children” is defined as the rest of the sample. The whole sample is every 
adult that is a head of a household or wife of a head. The income quintiles are calculated 
based on the average income for the period from 1997 to 2009, with the quintiles being 
determined by looking only at heads and wives of heads.   
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Saving rates (definition 
1) from 1999-2007 
Whole 
sample 
Without 
children 
With adult 
children only 
With 
dependent 
children 
All 
quintiles 
Median 0.053 0.045 0.076 0.052 
Mean 0.148 0.150 0.165 0.141 
Number of 
individuals 
8964 1335 2020 5705 
First 
income 
quintile 
Median 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Mean 0.062 0.032 0.044 0.077 
Second 
income 
quintile 
Median 0.021 0.017 0.033 0.019 
Mean 0.070 0.063 0.084 0.067 
Third 
income 
quintile 
Median 0.045 0.040 0.053 0.041 
Mean 0.134 0.158 0.090 0.132 
Fourth 
income 
quintile 
Median 0.092 0.103 0.127 0.084 
Mean 0.185 0.205 0.196 0.175 
Fifth 
income 
quintile 
Median 0.154 0.236 0.195 0.137 
Mean 0.271 0.325 0.384 0.233 
Proportion with negative 
saving rates across all 
income quintiles 
27.7% 31.6% 37.7% 24.3% 
Table 2: Long-term saving rates broken down by income quintiles and “child-status” 
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5.2.1 The effect of children on the saving rate 
Individuals with adult children have a higher mean saving rate and a higher median rate than 
those without children when all quintiles are looked at simultaneously. This pattern is 
repeated for the two lowest quintiles, while for the next two quintiles the mean is higher for 
those without children. For the fifth quintile the pattern is reversed, with a higher mean but 
lower quintile for those with adult children. Comparing those with adult children and those 
with dependent children gives similarly erratic results. Those with dependent children 
consistently have slightly lower saving rates than those without children. All in all the 
differences between the categories are minor. When the whole sample is examined a 
consistent pattern between income quintile and saving rate emerges. Both the median and 
mean saving rate increases monotonically with the income quintile. This pattern is largely 
repeated if one looks at the different “child-status”-groups.  
With median saving rates near, or slightly below zero for the two lowest income quintiles, it is 
clear that a large number of low-income households are dissaving. This pattern is repeated for 
the sample as a whole, with over a quarter of the households registering negative saving rates. 
This is a somewhat surprising result. One would not expect individuals to be able to maintain 
a negative saving rate over such a long period of time, let alone that it would be so common. 
There are several possible explanations. The simplest one is of course that the period looked 
at has been one where many individuals have had a higher consumption than income, and 
have therefore consumed their wealth or increased their debt. It is also possible that the saving 
period looked at does not begin and end at similar stages of the business cycle, so that asset 
values in general are low in 2007 compared to 1999. Since most households where 
interviewed well before the start of the 2007-2009 recession, and since the top of the previous 
business cycle occurred well after 1999, this is not a particularly compelling explanation. It 
should be noted that any inheritance or gifts received during the period are subtracted from 
the change in wealth. This could be important for some households. 
5.2.2 Long-term saving rates by age group 
Both the mean and the median saving rates are increasing with age until the age-group 45-54, 
with lower saving rates thereafter. This is broadly consistent with life-cycle theories of saving 
behavior. It is worth mentioning that this group is the highest age group where no one is in the 
typical pension age of 62 to 65 during the saving period. That the median in the two higher 
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age groups household has no net saving (and even negative saving for the highest age group) 
is interesting, and supports the findings of e.g. Bernheim (1987).  Even though the median 
household dissaves in old age, the mean saving rate is positive. This is a good reason to carry 
out quantile regressions on the data, so that the effect on the median can be examined. 
Looking at the wealth level at the beginning of the period, one sees that mean is increasing up 
to the age group 55 to 64, and the median wealth is increasing up to the age group from 65 to 
75. The lower wealth level of the oldest group deserves some comment. While it is not 
unexpected that the wealth level is lower, the magnitude of the reduction from the second 
oldest group to the oldest group is very large, with mean wealth levels less than half as high. 
If the saving rates in the preceding period were roughly similar to those seen here for each age 
group, one would not expect a drop at all. This is a clear indication that there is a cohort effect 
in the data, with the oldest group having lower wealth levels in part because of unique 
attributes to them as a group and not just because of their age. Similar cohort effects could 
exist with regards to the saving rate. The presence of cohort effects makes it advantageous to 
use panel data in the analysis, as this method will be better at identifying the true effect of age 
than the quantile regression or other forms of cross-sectional analysis. 
Age group 
(age in 1999) 
 
Saving rates 1999-2007 
 
Wealth level at beginning of 
period in 2007-dollars 
Median Mean Median Mean 
Age <25 0.022 0.122 4,003 19,019 
Age 25-34 0.056 0.146 17,137 72,184 
Age 35-44 0.060 0.162 50,310 186,852 
Age 45-54 0.086 0.176 108,944 321,079 
Age 55-64 0.074 0.157 168,068 544,543 
Age 65-75 0.000 0.051 187,530 534,066 
Age >75 -0.040 0.063 138,281 264,604 
Table 3: Long-term saving rates and wealth levels by age group 
 
37 
 
6 Regression Results 
This chapter gives the results of the regressions that have been run, and interprets the results. 
6.1 Choosing between the FE and RE models  
The Hausman test run on the limited sample consisting only of heads strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis that the random effects model provides consistent estimates.  
From the stata output: 
chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 176.83 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
This test shows that the estimators of a fixed effects model, which is known to be consistent, 
differs from the estimators in the random effects model. Therefore the estimators found using 
the random effects model are biased and cannot be used. The results from the Hausman test 
allow the null hypothesis to be rejected with a confidence of above 99 %. 
This means that the rest of the empirical analysis must be undertaken using a fixed effects 
model. As previously noted, a fixed effects model does not allow for time invariant variables, 
therefore neither the long term income nor the variance of the income can be used as 
variables. 
6.2 Summary of results from the main panel 
regression 
Table 4 sums up the most important results from the main regression. The main regression is 
a fixed effect model regression. More detailed results are reported in table X. The most 
important result is that the presence of adult children has a strongly significant positive effect 
on the short run saving rate. This could indicate the presence of a bequest motive, which 
would lend support to the dynastic theory of saving. Both the theoretical prediction in this and 
other papers, and the dynastic models used to simulate the wealth distribution between 
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households (such as in De Nardi 2004) indicate that the bequest motive should be stronger for 
richer households. However the results for the main regression show the opposite conclusion. 
The interaction variable between income and children has a negative sign, indicating that the 
effect of adult children on saving diminishes as the income increases.  
 
Saving measure: Standard 
Based on average income, without inheritance, with housing wealth,  
observations >92
nd
 and <8
th
 percentile of the distribution of saving rates excluded 
Key independent 
variable 
Adult children, 
exclusive 
indicator 
Dependents, 
indicator 
Interaction 
variable, income 
and children 
Log income 
Wealth level 
at beginning 
of period 
Sign + + - + + 
Significance lvl >0.99 >0.99 >0.95 >0.99 >0.99 
Table 4: Summary of regression results form fixed effect model with standard saving rate definition 
The presence of dependent children also has a positive effect on the saving rate, and this 
effect is statistically significant according to the regression. This is somewhat surprising. 
Dependents should increase the consumption needs of a household and therefore reduce the 
amount available to saver. This result can be interpreted as supporting the bequest motive. 
The bequest motive should also exist for individuals that have children below the age of 18, 
the results here can be interpreted as showing that this effect is stronger than the presumed 
negative effect of raising children on the saving rate. Of course the results can just as well 
indicate that individuals with children share some hidden characteristics that contribute to a 
higher saving rate. 
Both income levels and wealth levels have a positive effect on saving rates according to this 
regression. This is in accordance with the findings of Dynnan et. al (2000), who looked at 
earlier saving periods in the PSID. 
6.3 Details of results from main regression 
Tables 5a and b contains more detailed results from the main regression, as well as results 
from alternative specifications. Other than the results previously mentioned, the difference 
between the current income and the average income, inheritance, marital status, owning a 
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business and various age dummies give significant results for regression nr. 1. Having 
received an inheritance or a large gift during the saving period contributes to a lower saving 
rate according to the results. It is important to keep in mind that for this specification the 
value of the inheritance is neither included in the change in wealth, nor in the income value 
used to calculate the saving rate. The motivation for excluding inheritances is that it is 
ambiguous whether they should be treated as a temporary income, or as a form of hidden 
wealth (in the sense that receiving the inheritance was expected and it entered into the 
decision making of the individual before it was in fact received) that is suddenly made visible. 
That it has a negative effect on other saving could indicate that the inheritance is treated as a 
windfall income, and that the households spend more because they are somewhat myopic in 
their decision-making. This cause the increase in wealth to be smaller than the value of the 
inheritance, and subtracting the inheritance therefore mean that the saving rate is suppressed.  
Being married affects the saving rate positively. This is not surprising, in light of the results 
reported by Díaz-Giménez et. al (1997), showing the substantial effect of marriage on saving 
rates. Business owners also have higher rates of saving. This can be explained by the need to 
save in order to invest in the business if business owners face credit constraints. It can also be 
explained by precautionary saving if owning a business leads to more variance in the income, 
which the owner compensates for by saving more on average. In order for this to give a net 
positive effect the extra income saved when the business does well must exceed the 
reductions in the saving when the business is doing poorly. Alternatively the saving periods 
included in the study could be on average periods that were unusually profitable for 
businesses. 
A puzzling result is the effect of the difference between the short and long-term income. 
Theories of saving would predict that income values in excess of the average income would 
be saved, and that the effect on the saving rate would be positive. Instead the result is the 
opposite.  
With age dummies for all age groups older than <25-group, the coefficients for the age 
dummies must be interpreted as the extra effect of being in another age group compared to the 
baseline age group of those under 25. That no significant result is found for the age group 35-
44 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the saving behavior of these 
two groups. The results from the age dummies are broadly in line with life-cycle theories, in 
the sense that the saving rates first increases with age, then decreases. The surprise is the point 
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at which saving rates go down. The summary statistics indicated that the long term saving 
rates is highest for the group between 45 and 54, and that both the median and the mean 
saving rates where higher for the 55 to 64 year old group than for the youngest group. The 
difference could be because of the slightly different saving rates looked at (short-term rather 
than long term, and truncated at the top and bottom rather than the whole sample, but for the 
last consideration looking at regression 2 indicates that this is not a major concern). However 
it is more likely that the difference stems from the fact that the summary statistics only 
compare the overall saving rates, without explaining what drives the differences between the 
groups. The regression here shows a significant positive effect on saving rates of both higher 
wealth and higher incomes. Older households have both higher incomes and more wealth 
compared to younger ones. The regression is able to show that once this is taken into account, 
there is no separate positive effect of age to account for, quite the contrary.  
Several controlling variables are not significant in this regression, or in any of the alternative 
specifications. These include the education level of the individual, the presence of health 
insurance, and whether the individual is unemployed or retired. Education has a known effect 
on both the income and wealth of individuals. That the level of education itself cannot be 
shown to have an effect once these two variables are accounted for is not surprising. 
Similarly, unemployment reduces income considerably, removing any separate of 
unemployment in the data. Absence of health insurance should contribute to a higher level of 
precautionary saving since all medical expenses must then be paid out of pocket. That this 
effect is not seen in the data could be a sign that it does not exist, perhaps because those 
without health insurance differ in some other way from the rest of the sample in a manner that 
decreases their saving, or it could be a sign that the effect is too small to be seen. Over 85 % 
of the individuals in the sample are covered by some form of health insurance. The effect of 
retirement on the saving rate is largely what is being measured when one looks at the age 
profile of saving. Again the lack of a separate effect for the variable is not terribly surprising. 
6.4 Results with alternative specification 
Comparing the regression results 1 to 6 is useful in order to examine how sensitive the results 
are to the specifications. The main conclusion is clearly encouraging. For all the most 
important variables the sign does not vary between regressions. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is also broadly similar across regressions. Which variables are significant differs, 
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but all the most important variables are significant for all the regressions. The within model 
R-squared values are also similar for all the regression models. Choosing as a dependent 
variable a saving rate with fewer observations removed increases the R-squared value, but this 
is not surprising as this gives almost a thousand extra observations. It needs to be taken into 
account why there were removed in the first place: because the saving rate values were too 
extreme to be plausible.  
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Measure of saving rate 
1. Standard 
measure of the 
saving rate (same 
as in table X) 
2. Less truncated, 
1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile removed 
3. Based on short 
term income 
4. Based on saving 
rates that include 
inheritance 
Log Income .094 *** 0.025 *** 0.134 *** .091 *** 
Wealth level 7.59e-07 *** 2.32e-07 *** 7.88e-07 *** 7.74e-07 *** 
Diff. btw short and long-
term income 
-3.61e-07 ** Not significant -3.66e-07 * -3.45e-07 ** 
Adult child .699 *** 0.376 *** .606 *** .728 *** 
Interaction btw log 
income and adult 
children 
-.064 *** -0.140 *** -.057 *** -.067 *** 
Dependents .028 *** .087 *** .025 ** .026 ** 
Inheritance -.085 *** -.162 *** -.088 *** .091 *** 
Widow Not significant Not significant .167 ** Not significant 
Married .033 * .056 *** Not significant .036 ** 
Unemployed Not significant -.281 * Not significant Not significant 
Business owner .065 *** .149 *** .0514 ** .067 *** 
Prop. wealth in stocks Not significant -.033 * Not significant Not significant 
Age: 25-34 .104 *** .313 *** .102 *** 0.100 *** 
Age: 35-44 Not significant 0.141 *** Not significant Not significant 
Age: 45-54 -.108 *** -0.085 * - .117 *** -.115 *** 
Age: 55-64 -.246 *** -0.405 *** -.262 *** -.253 *** 
Age: 65-74 -.364 *** -0.649 *** -.382 *** -.375 *** 
Age: >74 -.383 *** -0.843 *** -.448 *** -.368 *** 
R
2
-within 
R
2
-overall 
Number of observations 
0.0715 
0.0105 
48854 
0.1285 
0.0154 
57285 
0.0722 
0.0104 
48915 
0.0741 
0.0114 
48851 
Tabel 5a: Results from fixed effect regressions with different dependent variables 
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Measure of saving rate 
1. Same as in 
previous table 
5. Based on saving 
rates that excludes 
housing 
6. Same as in 1, with alt. 
adult child indicator 
Log Income .094 *** .047 *** .097 *** 
Wealth level 7.59e-07 *** 8.07e-07 *** 8.02e-07  *** 
Diff. btw short and long-term 
income 
-3.61e-07 ** Not significant -3.49e-07 *** 
Adult child .699 *** .420 *** .587 *** 
Interaction btw log income 
and adult children 
-0.064 *** -.038 *** -.060 *** 
Dependents .028 *** 0.020 *** .025 ** 
Inheritance -.085 *** 0.82 *** -.086 *** 
Widow Not significant Not significant .131 * 
Married .033 * Not significant .038 ** 
Unemployed Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Business owner .065 *** 0.054 *** .067 *** 
Prop. wealth in stocks Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Age: 25-34 .104 *** 0.043 *** 0.100 *** 
Age: 35-44 Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Age: 45-54 -.108 *** -0.034 ** -.102 *** 
Age: 55-64 -.246 *** -0.101 *** -.239 *** 
Age: 65-74 -.364 *** -0.150 *** -.353 *** 
Age: >74 -.383 *** -0.123 *** -.367 *** 
R
2
-within 
R
2
-overall 
Number of observations 
0.0715 
0.0105 
48854 
0.0744 
0.0052 
48761 
0.0759 
0.0119 
49161 
Tabel 5b: Results from fixed effect regressions with different dependent variables 
The regression using the measure of saving rates that include values from the 1
st
 to the 99
th
 
percentile (2), show significant results (at the 90 % level) for unemployment and the 
proportion of wealth held in stocks, both with negative signs. This is most likely caused by 
unemployed people being generally in the lowest part of the distribution of saving rates, due 
to dissaving and low income values. The significance of the proportion of wealth held in 
stocks can similarly be explained by large losses of a few individuals occupying the lowest 
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parts of the distribution of saving rates. The effect of income on the saving rates is 
considerably smaller in this regression. This can be because the extra observations included 
are individuals who have earnings that fall outside the definition of income in the PSID or that 
is underreported, which would both lead to extreme values the saving rate and lead to income 
being less important in the regression. 
6.5 Result from quantile regression on long term 
saving rate 
Tables 6a and b sum up the results from the quantile regressions as well as the OLS-
regression. The most striking result from the median regression is that the effect of adult 
children and dependents is the opposite as that found in the panel regression. This undermines 
the conclusion from the previous regressions that the data support the bequest motive. 
However in this regression the interaction effect between income and adult children is 
positive. This could imply that for some levels of income the saving rate is higher when for 
those with children than those without children.  
Using the property that quadratic regression estimators are equivariant to monotone 
transformations, it is possible to calculate at what income level individuals with saving rates 
at the median level and with adult children have higher saving rates than they would have had 
without children. 
The effect of income on the saving rate is        , while it is                , with β 
subscript 1, 2 and 3 are the regression coefficients for log mean income, the adult child 
indicator, and the interaction between log mean income and adult children respectively, and x 
being the mean income level. 
From this we can conclude that when                       , the presence of adult 
children contributes positively to the saving rate. The level x can be calculated: 
                       
   
   
  
⁄
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This gives the result that when the mean income is above $ 27,744 (in 2007-dollars) adult 
children no longer reduce the saving rate. This is a fairly low level of income, meaning that 
many individuals do in fact exhibit saving behavior that indicates the presence of a bequest 
motive. That the bequest motive is stronger for higher incomes is in line with the theoretical 
predictions, but is the opposite result from that found using the panel regressions. 
Unfortunately no significant results are found for adult children or the interaction effect in the 
quantile regression for the top quantile of in the OLS-regression. Therefore the results are not 
terribly robust.  
The effect of dependents on saving rate is negative for the median regression, unlike in the 
panel regressions. Neither the other quantile regressions, nor the OLS-regression get 
significant results. 
An interesting result from the quantile regressions is that the effect of the variance of the 
income varies with the quantile looked at. At the median of the distribution of saving rates, at 
the ninth decile of the saving rate distribution, and for mean saving rates (which is what the 
result from the OLS describe), a higher variance in the income leads to higher saving rates, as 
precautionary theories of saving predict. This is the opposite of the surprising effect found for 
the difference between the short term and long term income in the panel regression. That 
variable was meant to pick up a similar effect without violating the fixed effect models 
incompatibility with time-invariant regressors. The interesting aspect here is that for the 
lowest levels of saving, the effect of increased variation in income is negative. A similar 
reversion of the effects of variables from the highest decile to the lowest decile is seen with 
the inheritance received from 1999 to 2007 and with the wealth level at the beginning of the 
period. This could be explained as a story of the spendthrift individuals at the bottom of the 
distribution that consume whatever wealth they happen to have, as opposed to the misers at 
the top of the distribution, who always want to save more, regardless of how high the wealth 
level already is. 
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Variable q=0.1 Median (q=0.5) q=0.9 
OLS with cluster-
robust standard 
errors 
Log of mean income .179*** .067*** Not significant .150*** 
SD of income -3.10e-07 *** 5.06e-07 *** 1.76e-06 ** 2.08e-06 * 
Wealth level in 1999 -1.13e-06 *** -1.43e-07 *** 3.74e-07 ** -4.43e-07 ** 
Adult child -1.82 *** -.399 *** Not significant Not significant 
Interaction income and 
adult children 
.162 *** .039 *** Not significant Not significant 
Dependents at some 
point btw 1999-2007 
Not significant -.019 *** Not significant Not significant 
Inheritance btw 1999-
2007 
-9.65e-07 *** Not significant 1.68e-06 ** Not significant 
Widow -.0593 * Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Married .042 *** .017 *** Not significant Not significant 
Health Insurance Not significant Not significant -.079 * Not significant 
Unemployed at some 
point btw 1999-2007 
Not significant Not significant -.196 *** -.178 *** 
Business owner Not significant Not significant .312 *** Not significant 
Proportion of wealth in 
stocks 
Not significant .008 *** Not significant Not significant 
Note: *** indicate that the results are significant to the 99 % level, ** that they are significant to the 95 
% level, while * indicates that they are significant to the 90 % level 
Tabel 6a: Results of quantile regression and OLS-regression 
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Variable q=0.1 Median (q=0.5) q=0.9 
OLS with cluster 
robust standard 
errors 
Age: 25-34 Not significant .020 *** Not significant Not significant 
Age: 35-44 Not significant .018 *** .085 * Not significant 
Age: 45-54 Not significant .027 *** .110 ** Not significant 
Age: 55-64 Not significant .037 ** .217 *** .159 ** 
Age: 65-74 Not significant Not significant .168 * Not significant 
Age: >74 -.346 *** Not significant .699 ** Not significant 
Pseudo R
2 
N=8551
 
0.3246 0.0295 0.0623 
R
2
: 0.1043 
N=8551 
Saving rate at 
quintile 
(descriptive 
statistic) 
-.286 .015 .169 
Mean saving rate: 
0.148 
Note: *** indicate that the results are significant to the 99 % level, ** that they are significant to the 95 
% level, while * indicates that they are significant to the 90 % level. 
Table 6b: Results of quantile regression and OLS-regression, part 2 
Another interesting observation from the quantile regressions is that demographic variables, 
such as marital status and widowhood have an effect at the bottom of the saving rate 
distribution, while variables that predict higher risks have an effect at the top end of the 
distribution. All these effects are of the type one would expect, widows save less, married 
couples save more. Owning a business, with the risks that entails, increases saving, as does 
unemployment and not having health insurance. The individuals at the top of the saving rate 
distribution therefore seem to be motivated by precautionary saving. 
The effects of age on saving are more or less in accordance with positive contributions to the 
saving rates at the median for all working-age years (the years from 25 to 64), and a saving 
rate that mostly increases with age. However the relationship is less clear than that seen by 
looking at the summary statistics alone.  
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have seen that an example of a dynastic theory of saving predicts that the 
presence of children should contribute to a bequest motive, but that this motive will mostly be 
present in richer households. This is because, when the utility of the heirs is what motivates 
the parents to give bequests, this motivation will only give rise to an actual bequest if the 
marginal utility for the parents from the bequest is higher than the marginal utility of 
consumption when the whole income is consumed by the parents. The combination of mean 
reverting income levels and economic growth indicate that most children will have a higher 
consumption level than their parents. In addition to this the possibility of spending money on 
education instead of on bequests will further reduce the bequest level, since no money will be 
spent on bequests until the marginal utility of spending on education is the same as the return 
on financial assets. It is possible to construct other models of bequest motivation that give 
other predictions, such as a joy of giving model. Since this set of predictions is based on a 
plausible, if very simplified, theory of behavior, and since wealth inequality among the top 
end of the distribution is what many dynastic models seek to explain, it is a convenient 
starting point for the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis is based on panel data on 
wealth and income from the PSID, from the period from 1997 to 2007. 
Summary statistics of the data used showed clear indications of a life-cycle pattern in the 
saving rates. Furthermore the effect of the business cycle was visible, which can be 
interpreted as supporting a precautionary motive, if the higher saving in boom years and 
lower saving in recession years were the results of deliberate choices, rather than simply 
volatility in asset prices. 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, the fixed effect model panel regression provided 
support for the presence of a bequest motive. Both the adult children indicator and the 
presence of dependents in the household, the majority of which are the children of the 
economic decision makers in the household, had a statistically significant positive effect on 
the saving rate. Surprisingly the effect of adult children decreased with income, which is the 
opposite of what one would expect. The results from this analysis also confirmed the positive 
effect of income and wealth in general, and gave some indication of a life-cycle pattern in the 
saving rates. 
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The analysis of long term saving rates using quantile regressions and a cluster robust OLS-
regression gave strikingly different results. Where the effects of adult children and dependents 
was significant, it had the opposite sign of the one found in the panel analysis. Interestingly 
the interaction variable between income and adult children was positive in this analysis. This 
means that for a sufficiently high income, the net effect of having adult children is to increase 
the saving rate. This is accordance with the theoretical prediction; however this was only seen 
for the median regression and for the regression of the lowest quintile of the saving rate 
distribution. The results are therefore largely inconclusive with respect to whether a bequest 
motive can be identified in the data. This is not entirely surprising as the lack of very wealthy 
households in the PSID makes this data set less than ideal for identifying a bequest motive. 
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